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ABSTRACT 
Structural changes in open source software and increased involvement of commercial organizations in the development and 
governance of open source projects represent a departure from the „pure‟ open source paradigm and an emergence of a new 
collaborative model. In this paper we call for a new perspective on open source software research that explains this latest 
alliance with commercial vendors. We argue that open source is about governance, not just free code. It‟s the uniqueness of a 
governance model that differentiates successful collaborations. The transformation of OSS bazaar-like process to a more 
structured development, while maintaining the bazaar product could not be achieved successfully without the establishment 
of an optimal collaborative governance model. 
Keywords 
Hybrid governance, collaborative open source software, transaction cost economics, interorganizational cooperation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Open source software‟s extraordinary method of organization gave rise to a new collaborative structure that engages diverse 
resources. OSS is experiencing significant involvement of commercial IT vendors and other proprietary software 
development companies. Until recently, commercial vendors considered open source as a low profile hobbyist activity with 
insignificant impact on their market share. However, as OSS grew and amassed a strong following, commercial IT vendors 
adopted a less hostile posture that embraced the „movement‟. Currently, giant vendors such as IBM, Intel, Oracle, and HP are 
participating and supporting different open source projects.  
This study applies the premise of transaction cost economics and interorganizational collaboration theories of adopting cost-
minimizing governance structure to open source and commercial (for-profit) organization partnerships, designed for software 
development transaction. Our attempt to understand the implications of such relationships is conducted on the basis that both 
parties agreed to form an out-of-band association in the form of „cooperative adaptation‟, which is a departure from the 
classical form of alliance, in order to achieve mutual benefits and cost savings. We maintain that the impact of IT vendors 
and commercial organizations involvement in OSS projects calls for immediate attention and rigorous research to determine 
the prospect of such a special form of alliance.  
 
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE OVERVIEW 
Open source software, also known as free, libre, open source software (FLOSS), is generally defined as the process of 
producing software products and applications by volunteer participants to create public good (von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003). Throughout this paper the term open source software will be used to denote both free and open source software
1
. 
Advocates of OSS claim it to be the “next great thing” that would revolutionize the software industry (Raymond, 2000), 
while those facing threat from the „movement‟ momentum, mainly proprietary software development shops, ascribe as an 
intellectual property infringement. 
                                                          
1
 Philosophical differences between open source software and free software are beyond the scope of this study. For further 
details, the reader is referred to respective foundations and proponents of each. Open Source Initiative is the advocate of open 
source software; www.opensource.org. Free Software Foundation goal is to promote computer user freedom and to defend 
their rights; www.fsf.org 
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Open source is ascribed as a voluntary nonprofit community organized around a vast number of software projects.  The OSS 
project is recognized as the entity that receives significant support from voluntary contributions represented in time, effort, 
and/or money. The group culture is based on shared beliefs, values, and basic assumptions associated with voluntary 
participation for the public good (Ott 2001, p. 288). It is reasonable to assume the OSS phenomenon is driven by economic 
agents performing actions that maximize their utility function. Volunteer developers would be conscious of opportunity cost 
of invested assets (Valentinov 2008) and project organizers would want to operate efficiently while upholding community 
values.  
Dahlander and Magnusson (2005) argue that various relationship structures exist between open source projects and 
commercial companies. The symbiotic approach, where both parties gain from the alliance, might be the most effective at 
influencing the project members and achieving collaborative governance mechanisms. However, this approach introduces 
managerial challenges related to decision rights and control between the different parties. Some of the operational means of 
enabling governance require resolving ambiguity about control and ownership, aligning different interests, creating and 
maintaining a positive reputation, and investing in channels for proactive interactions. The collective transformation of open 
source led to the emergence of a new generation, or what‟s been ascribed as OSS 2.0 (Fitzgerald, 2006).  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is an interdisciplinary field that deals with the establishment of governance and 
institutional arrangements (Williamson, 1979). Institutional arrangement is an arrangement between economic units, which 
govern their cooperation and establish a structure for members‟ interaction (Davis, North and Smorodin, 1971). The theory 
explains why some products/services are produced internally within a firm (vertically integrated) with a hierarchical 
governance structure while others are produced and purchased on an external market. In the next subsections we present a 
summary of the underlying elements of TCE
2
.  
Governance  
TCE applications largely focus on governance structures. The theory predicts that transactions are embedded in governance 
structures that minimize vulnerability (Williamson, 1998). Gies, Ott, and Shafritz (1990) recognized governance as the 
function of control and administration that takes place when a group of people come together to legally incorporate under the 
laws of a state for a nonprofit organizational purpose (p. 178). TCE theorists argue that in interfirm cooperation settings, 
there might be adverse consequences to collaboration due to potential untrustworthiness and self-interest behavior of argents 
involved in a transaction (Williamson, 1979). Hence, having collaborating parties retain the incentive for maintaining the 
relationship by the  establishment of governance mechanisms, also acknowledged as „safeguards‟, in order to reduce 
transaction costs incurred by opportunism and environment uncertainty becomes an essential goal of the theory. 
TCE differentiate between three general forms of governance mechanisms, namely: vertical (hierarchical) highly-specific 
governance (Williamson, 1979; Barney, 1999), intermediate or hybrid (semi-specific) governance (Williamson, 1979, 1985), 
and market (non-transaction-specific) governance (Williamson, 1979; Judge and Dooly 2006). This study is motivated by the 
second type of governance; explicitly semi-specific or intermediate structure for governing alliances between an open source 
project and profit-oriented partners. In an attempt to address the governance decision, some earlier studies maintained that the 
governance question is simply a factor of early selection and setting some form of socialization efforts, or a combination of 
both (Heide and John, 1990). Other studies recognized this form of organization as value-added partnership (Johnston and 
Lawrence, 1988) and strategic alliance (Webster 1992; Saxton 1997). 
Vertical Integration  
Vertical integration represents a restrictive form of organization favoring internal exchanges within firm boundaries. This 
method implies full control of resources by the organization and eliminates dependency on external entities. According to 
Perry (1989), transactional economies perception is one of the key determinants of vertical integration. Seemingly, the 
outcome of vertical integration is reducing the requirements of intermediate exchange inputs. TCE theorize that one of the 
                                                          
2
 Due to the extensive literature of TCE across various domains, selective review related to governance in collaborative 
setting is presented here. We direct attention to cited sources for further details. 
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incentives of firm‟s adoption of integration of a process is to internalize transactional economies and eventually reduce its 
transaction costs.  
Asset Specificity  
Asset specificity is a characteristic of an investment‟s transferability from one transaction or setting to an alternative one. 
Recognized as a notion of sunk cost, TCE maintain that switching specific assets from one setting to a different one will 
result in lowering the value of these assets. Therefore, partners associated with a transaction that involves “appropriable 
quasi-rents” are more likely to remain in partnership and work together to attain mutual satisfactory benefits.   
Distinctly, TCE research differentiates between two types of asset specificity: intangible and tangible. Intangible factors are 
identified by the uniqueness of skills, functions and business knowledge required for completing a particular transaction 
(Williamson, 1985; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999; Subramani, 2004). On the other hand, tangible assets include any 
form of physical or monetary contributions. It‟s important to point out that other forms of asset specificity might take place 
during the course of a transaction. For example Polanyi (1963) identified personal knowledge as an important type of 
idiosyncratic assets. As a consequence, the theory claims that asset specificity leads to diverse forms of governance 
structures, formed in response to protect such investments (Williamson, 1989).  This assumption becomes an important 
notion in explaining why organizations adopt different forms of governance.  
Uncertainty  
Human bounded rationality and limited capacity to encompass all variables of decision making has an effect on degree of 
uncertainty present in a transaction. TCE acknowledge that hazards are due to the behavioral uncertainty appearing as a result 
of a combined effect of incomplete contracting and asset specificity. Therefore determination of most relevant aspects of a 
transaction is achieved with reasonable amount of uncertainty. 
Empirical studies have shown that certain forms of uncertainty have direct influence on the choice of governance structure 
and subsequently transaction costs (Heide and John, 1990; Masten, Meehan and Snyder, 1991; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1995). A multi-dimensional uncertainty construct identified in the literature includes: technological uncertainty, which 
involves technical level of future product change (Walker and Weber, 1984; Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986), behavioral 
uncertainty involving parties joined in a condition of bilateral dependency (Anderson, 1985; Williamson, 1989; Heide and 
John, 1990) and environmental uncertainty (Walker and Weber, 1984). The theory also involves a secondary type of 
uncertainty factor, demonstrated by lack of communication between decision makers that restrict access to concurrent 
decisions and plans made by others (Koopmasn, 1957, p. 147). While Williamson (1989) claims the last type of uncertainty is 
“nonstrategic”, we argue that uncertainty due to lack of, or non-established channels of communication becomes important in 
transactions linking parties of corporate and community organizations.  
Opportunism  
Acknowledged as one of transaction cost economics behavioral assumptions, opportunism is characterized as the human trait 
of seeking self-interest with guile (Williamson, 1989. p. 139). The potential of a partner to default on the other or exhibit 
opportunistic behavior will have negative implications reflected in incurring higher transaction costs. The theory also argues 
that threats of significant opportunism will lead players in a transaction to opt for a governance of collaboration that 
safeguard against these threats. Safeguarding against potential opportunistic behavior might involve transaction costs in the 
form of negotiating costs, bonding costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs (Hill, 1990).  
Strategic alliance research showed that opportunism is a particularly important problem, especially in alliances that engages 
members from different organizations (Judge and Dooley, 2006).  In addition, several studies revealed that while it‟s not 
necessary all agents have the same level of opportunistic behavior, any perception of opportunism between the parties of an 
alliance would negatively impact performance (Williamson 1979; Ring and van de Ven, 1994; Saxton, 1997).  
 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION THEORY 
While TCE represent a general framework for examining governance of joint transactions between open source and for-profit 
organizations, it‟s more informative to guide the investigation within definitive boundaries by concentrating on key activities 
characterized by the institutional model. Employing the interorganizational cooperation (IC) premise, within the domain of 
transaction cost economics, the study highlights key elements of the collaborative governance. We posit that TCE and 
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articulated dimensions of interorganizational cooperation behavior, together, provide a richer foundation for explaining 
governance issues of open source projects and commercial companies collaborative transactions.  
Emphasizing the impact of interdependence between the parties involved in a transaction, IC theory argues that parties tend 
to cooperate when there are shared assets and dependency on each other (Williamson 1985, 1991b, Osborn and Hagedoorn, 
1997). Early research investigated determinates of interorganizational cooperation (Schermerhorn, 1975) found that 
cooperation is more likely to take place in circumstances where organizational domains are not sensitive issues; in most cases 
the parties are not engaged in competing activities. Also collaboration is likely to occur where mutual goals among parties are 
obtainable. There are also some negative implications associated with interorganizational cooperation. For example, entities 
participating in interorganizational cooperation venues might suffer a loss of decision-making autonomy, experience loss or 
damage to their identity and image, or they might over burden their limited organizational resources (Schermerhorn, 1975).  
From a transaction cost point of view, various forms of interorganizational relationship, such as joint ventures or network 
structures, are considered alternative forms of governance and departures from the generic organizational hierarchy (make) or 
market (buy) decision (Barringer and Harrison 2000). In the next section we specifically address governance and established 
cooperative activities in the context of managing open source-commercial organization alliance.  
 
TOWARDS A NEW FORM OF GOVERNANCE  
TCE assert that the principle of defining various forms of governance structures, or safeguard and control mechanisms, is to 
promote transaction‟s egalitarianism.  We argue that open source is an economic arrangement. Although it appears to lack 
monetary incentive drivers, yet other forms of organization hold, including labor and resource allocation in order to produce 
public goods and services. Open source software development provision stems from the fundamental voluntary contribution 
notion of the public goods theory (Johnson, 2002). In particular, OSS development regime creates software products 
available for both original volunteer contributors, as well as, the masses.  
The importance of dedicated and enthusiastic leadership is recognized as one of the major factors for ensuring focused vision 
and fueled innovation.  In contrast to commercial software development process management, OSS project leadership role is 
less authoritative but more about recruiting and vetting good talent for the project and avoiding interference. Study results 
shown that leadership attainment in OSS projects is a factor of technical contribution and organization building (O‟Mahony 
and Ferraro, 2007)  
In a hybrid collaborative setting, the partnership between OSS and the alliance organization could be a result of the company 
being the initiator of the project, or the partner proprietary organization joins an existing open source development effort.  
Regardless of original partner leadership status, the new leadership typically has to earn credibility (Fogel, 2007). One of the 
objectives of collaborative software development between open source projects and commercial partner(s) is the arrangement 
of institutional form based on principal foundations and an interest in minimizing cost. This new configuration would lead 
each party to perceive themselves at an advantage point by continuing the alliance than by ending it. Although no formal 
contracts are defined to oversee cooperation between the two parties yet OSS-commercial vendor affiliation is governed 
through embedded unofficial „self-enforcing‟ agreements (Telser, 1980), sponsorship and safeguards.  
Extending transaction cost analysis to the “non-profit” OSS domain requires careful treatment. Nevertheless, the hybrid 
model attempts to define an optimal governance structure that yields meritorious results. The special control form is 
established to oversee exchange agreement and joint operation as a semi-specific structure. From a commercial perspective 
the partnership between an OSS project and business involvement is considered a special form of value-added partnership. 
This study adopts a multi-dimension governance arrangement for the alliance, pertaining to information flow, level of 
flexibility, influence restraint, and shared responsibility. In conformity with Heide and Miner‟s (1990, 1992) view of alliance 
and domains of cooperation, we hypothesize that the degree of cooperation between the two parties involved in a hybrid 
mode of open source development, as opposed to pure open source or totally proprietary development, is a function of their 
boundaries‟ transparency and readiness to rationalize commitment to each other. Such practice is a first step towards 
achieving a justifiable cost-suppressant governance structure along with underlying building blocks. Figure 1 shows the new 
form of governance for collaborative OSS. 
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Information Flow 
Software development as a transaction is embedded in governance structures that minimize vulnerability (Williamson, 1998) 
and create a perpetual environment for future growth and scalability. The importance of establishing bilateral communication 
channels is recognized in classical organizational theory to have both supplementary and complementary roles to existing 
channels in any organization structure (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). In the absence of formal firm boundaries, open source 
projects undertake transparency and a free flow of knowledge and information on project mailing lists and discussion boards 
as mechanisms for mitigating uncertainty and potential conflicts.  
As commercial vendors engage in the project, amplified levels of communication and information sharing becomes more 
eminent for resolving dependency and assuring complete engagement. Collaboration research shows that the alliance form of 
governance is influenced by the level of interdependence and requirement for information sharing (Gulati and Singh, 1998). 
The higher the level of interdependence and transaction complexity, the greater the amount of information sharing is needed 
between partners. Given that software development is a highly complex task that involves multiple dependencies across 
different parties, it‟s the control mechanism of OSS project-commercial partnership that comes into effect for managing flow 
and defining level of information granularity. Certainly, it‟s the access to information possessed by each party that reduces 
the degree to which information asymmetry might pose a risk to the performance of partnership. We reason that partnership 
form of governance will resolve the challenges for coordinating tasks between open source and commercial partners by 
investing in setting up economical methods that reduce coordination costs.  
Level of Flexibility 
The other dimension of governance implicates strategic flexibility of relationship between OSS project and commercial 
partners. Previous research reveals that increased flexibility of interorganizational collaboration to be a pre-required phase for 
OSS 
Governance 
Partner‟s 
Governance 
Collaborative Governance 
 Information Flow 
 Level of Flexibility 
 Shared Responsibility 
 Influence Restraint 
  
 
*Bazaar structure 
*Product-oriented 
*Visionary leadership 
*Democratic decision 
making 
*Cathedral structure 
*Profit-Oriented 
*Authoritative 
*Bureaucratic 
decision making 
Figure 1: Collaborative Governance Model 
Sidahmed et al.  Governance of Collaborative Open Source Software 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 6 
improved efficiency and cost reduction (Chebbi, Dustdarb and Tataa, 2006). Moreover, a rapidly changing software and 
technology environment demands swift response and managed adaptability.  
In alliance setting, flexibility, identified as the partnership‟s  ability to cope with environment changes (Aaker and 
Macarenhas, 1984) and continuous adjustment to emerging states (Bahrami, 1992), stems from instituted governance mode of 
joint collaboration. Success of the relationship between the open source project and proprietary vendor partner commands the 
later to refrain from attempting to impose corporate-style structure and bear an approachable attitude towards open source‟s 
casual nature. The new formed governance should be established according to the needs of partnership, and availability of 
competencies and matching roles. Parallel to previous studies that found establishment of flexible arrangements to have a 
positive effect on alliance performance and satisfaction (Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart and Kerwood, 2004), we argue that 
parties‟ willingness to alter agreements and priorities when unexpected events arise will positively affect satisfaction with the 
outcome of the partnership.  
Influence Restraint 
Often, strategic relationships involve stakeholders that are cautious about power exploitation that could lead to the damage of 
the offending party‟s “social face” and show concern about the potential loss of future opportunities for the spoiled partner  
(Cook and Emerson, 1978; Luo, 2001). The fact that the party with superior power willingly abstains from exercising their 
veto power to override the less powerful party‟s shared control on project direction and key decisions is a crucial protection 
against power friction, potential project „forking‟ and/or demise of the relationship. Several studies support the favorable 
implications of fair power distribution and equally shared control of the alliance. Some of the direct implications of such 
positive practices are reflected in improved work attitudes and behavior and organizational commitment (McFarlin and 
Sweeney, 1992; Van den Bos, Wilke and Lind, 1998).  
A typical example of partnership influence restraint is represented by the scenario that when given the chance, the 
commercial partner avoids exploiting the open source project and vice versa (Heide and Miner 1992). Moreover studies on 
cross-organizational power sharing and use underscores the positive role of interfirm power control in promoting trust and 
effective coordination of partners‟ activities (Frazier and Summers 1986; Zaheer and Harris, 2005). We suggest that setting 
up well-defined limits for each party‟s level of power will stimulate favorable results of open source-commercial company 
affiliation.  
Shared Responsibility 
Arguably, within the open source context, vertical integration would encompass full development and control of a project by 
open source members without relying on support or sponsorship from any commercial organization or foundation. All efforts 
of design, organization, implementation, and promotion of the project are exclusively under the project‟s internal governance. 
As a result of total „vertical integration‟ open source grows to maintain a fuzzy set of distributed responsibilities among 
volunteer members. Collectively, this comes to define overall commitment to the success of open source in general. Shared 
values, self esteem, and altruism are key players for maintaining OSS developers renewed interest and desire for successful 
results.  
As commercial vendors hold direct involvement in OSS projects, a new framework of responsibility would necessarily come 
into effect. Interorganizational cooperation literature assumes that cooperative activities of an alliance would take some form 
of joint decision-making process and mutual control (Mulford and Rogers, 1982). Moreover, in support of common 
responsibility, the theory calls for building consensus and coordinating actions of member partners (Galaskiewicz, 1985). 
Because profit-oriented companies are inclined to introduce a structured model of accountability to the partnership, the new 
governance model will have to account for the extent to which open source projects and commercial partners distribute 
responsibility in a fashion that supports the alliance and build safety nets for handling future lapses. Heiman and Nickerson 
(2002) posit that the governance choice of an alliance facilitates identification of knowledge sources and promotes joint 
actions required to solve problems within a coalition setting. Commonly, resources required for particular tasks are drawn 
from the shared pool of open source project and commercial organization‟s resources 
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 In general, acknowledging diverse stakeholders‟ goals and intentions of collaboration, it‟s legitimate to argue that the new 
form of OSS development requires a special control structure, well defined roles, and departure from „bazaar-like‟ 
governance mode. Also, research shows that establishment of a special form of governance structure that is in alignment with 
transaction attributes has a first order effect on subsequent patterns of participation and engagement of future partners (Shah 
2006). In addition, different aspects related to governance choice are found to yield dissimilar performance outcomes for 
transactions with diverse organizational forms (Leiblein, Reuer and Dalsace, 2002). The latest conclusion supports earlier 
results which identifies the influence of governance choice on partnership performance (Walker and Webber, 1984; 
Williamson, 1985; Heide and John, 1990). We hypothesize that satisfaction with a new form of collaboration for open source 
software development forms an integral part of the organizational assimilation process (Pieters, Koelemeijer and Roest, 
1995). Also the moderating effect of experience with the commercial partner can provide an evaluation for making 
subsequent judgments about the hybrid mode viability.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Materialization of a new model of open source software marks a transition from the bazaar process to a more structured 
process for producing open source products. Given recognition of the special form of collaboration between open source and 
commercial organization(s), it‟s expected that a new form of interorganizational cooperation would emerge to account for the 
two parties differences. In addition, it is likely that the role of transaction cost will presume another level of importance and 
allow for alternative interpretations within the open source context. For our research we focus attention towards the type of 
organizational interdependency that involves the establishment of joint, cooperative activities between open source project 
communities and for-profit organizations (i.e. OSS companies, IT vendors, etc…). We posit that stream line of information 
flow between OSS project and commercial partner, development of flexible cooperative alliance, control of power and 
influence of one party on the less dominant one, and promotion of shared and common responsibility yields satisfactory 
collaborative governance. Without these structures, we contend that the hybrid model of OSS cannot succeed. In face of 
failure OSS project will confront the choice of reverting back to the „vertical‟ volunteer model, or being taken by the IT 
vendor. Our hypothesized contention requires empirical study. 
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